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BAN THE BLACK BOX: CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND SCREENING AND THE 
INFORMATION-WITHHOLDING PROBLEM 
INTRODUCTION 
Beverly Harrison worked for the city of Dallas, Texas, for twenty-eight 
years before she retired to devote more time to her grandchildren and her 
church.1 In 2013, Harrison took a job as a crossing guard for Dallas County 
Schools to supplement her retirement income.2 Eight days into her new role, 
Harrison was terminated.3 The cause? A nearly forty-year-old assault 
conviction on her background check, stemming from an altercation when 
Harrison was just eighteen.4 Although Harrison’s criminal record had not 
barred her from a long career in public service or several years as a home 
health aide, she was dismissed from her new role without discussion.5 
With an increasing number of employers performing background checks 
on potential employees,6 stories like Harrison’s are all too common. When 
a candidate fills out a job application, often one of the questions she will 
encounter is, “Have you ever been convicted of a crime?”7 A “yes” may 
spell the end of her candidacy.8 Even when a candidate makes it through the 
selection process, like Harrison, she may find that a criminal record stands 
in the way of continued employment. 
An inability to obtain employment is one of the collateral consequences 
that affects an individual’s ability to reintegrate into society following 
criminal conviction.9 As in Harrison’s case, the barrier to employment can 
persist for years or even decades. This is a problem for a large and still-
growing segment of the population,10 as a result of the “tough-on-crime” 
                                                      
1. Beverly Harrison, A Decades-Old Conviction Cost Me My Post-Retirement Job, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 10, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/09/10/a-dec 
ades-old-conviction-cost-me-my-post-retirement-job [https://perma.cc/5CC8-WUT2].  
2. Id.  
3. Id.  
4. Id. 
5. Id.  
6. According to one survey, eighty-nine percent of employers conduct background checks on 
prospective employees. STERLING TALENT SOLS., BACKGROUND SCREENING TRENDS & BEST 
PRACTICES REPORT 2017–2018, at 10 (2017). 
7. See id. at 19. 
8. Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial 
Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 453 (2006). 
9. See infra notes 29–35 and accompanying text. 
10. As of 2010, an estimated nineteen million U.S. citizens had felony convictions. Sarah K. S. 
Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony Records in the United 
States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1806 (2017). 











policies prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s.11 These policies have 
disproportionately affected racial minorities—particularly black and 
Hispanic men—exacerbating the challenges they already face in obtaining 
employment.12 Legislators have responded to these interlinking problems 
with laws to remove “the box,” the criminal-record question on job 
application forms.13 The fundamental theory of “Ban the Box” (BTB) laws 
is that if a candidate with a criminal record14 is considered on his own merits 
before his criminal history is revealed, the employer will be more willing to 
hear him explain the circumstances of the offense and provide evidence of 
rehabilitation.15 
BTB laws exist within a larger framework of employment laws designed 
to inhibit the flow of sensitive information that employers receive about 
potential employees.16 Like criminal records, some information that 
employers receive during the candidate selection process may 
disproportionately disadvantage minorities who already face obstacles to 
employment. As more of these types of laws are enacted, studies indicate 
that they may have the opposite of the intended effect.17 Recent research 
indicates that BTB laws may worsen employment outcomes for young black 
and Hispanic men.18 These studies conclude that, in the absence of concrete 
information, employers assume that minority candidates are more likely to 
have criminal records and decline to hire them.19 These findings have 
generated much discussion about the value of BTB laws.20 Reports suggest 
                                                      
11. See infra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 47–90 and accompanying text.  
14. Consistent with scholarship on the stigma of criminal records, this Note uses “person-first” 
language (“individuals with criminal records”) instead of the more common “crime-first” language (“ex-
offenders”) to deemphasize the stigma of criminal records. Megan Denver et al., The Language of 
Stigmatization and the Mark of Violence: Experimental Evidence on the Social Construction and Use of 
Criminal Record Stigma, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 664 (2017). See also Elizabeth P. Weissert, Comment, Get 
out of Jail Free: Preventing Employment Discrimination Against People with Criminal Records Using 
Ban the Box Laws, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1530 n.1 (2016). 
15. See infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
16. Examples include bans on pre-employment credit checks, see infra notes 130–134 and 
accompanying text, and limitations on questions about marital status to female job applicants, see infra 
notes 142–152 and accompanying text.  
17. See infra notes 126–152 and accompanying text. 
18. Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: 
A Field Experiment (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16-012, 2016), http 
s://ssrn.com/abstract=2795795; Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or 
Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes when Criminal 
Histories Are Hidden (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22469, 2016), http://www.nb 
er.org/papers/w22469 [https://perma.cc/8894-GW3M]. 
19. See infra notes 91–125 and accompanying text. 
20. Alana Semuels, When Banning One Kind of Discrimination Results in Another, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/consequences-of-ba 
n-the-box/494435 [https://perma.cc/ET9R-VM49]; “Ban The Box” Laws, Do They Help Job Applicants 













that they may hamper further BTB legislation.21 Some legal commentators 
have responded with calls to repeal BTB laws and pursue alternative means 
of redressing criminal-record discrimination.22 
This Note examines the implications of these recent studies in the context 
of BTB’s goals. Part I traces the development of the BTB movement and 
surveys current political responses to the call to delay criminal-record 
inquiries. Part II examines recent research suggesting that BTB laws lead to 
an increase in race discrimination in hiring. Part III contextualizes this 
research within a broader theme of negative effects produced by 
withholding key information during the candidate selection process. This 
information-withholding problem surfaces on both sides, with employers 
and candidates alike relying on guesswork to find the right fit. Part IV 
recommends breaking through the mystification from the candidate’s side. 
By increasing the information available to the candidate, candidates can 
make more informed decisions about which jobs to seek, and employers will 
see the benefit of a stronger candidate pool.   
I. THE HISTORY OF BAN-THE-BOX 
A. Development of the Ban-the-Box Movement 
BTB laws are a product of efforts to address the aftermath of increased 
rates of criminal convictions in the past several decades.23 “Tough-on-
crime” policies enacted since the 1970s have caused arrest and incarceration 
rates to soar.24 Approximately one and a half million individuals are 
currently in state or federal prison, a fivefold increase since 1980.25 As these 
                                                      
33/are-ban-the-box-laws-helping-job-applicants-with-criminal-histories [https://perma.cc/S7BA-RZT 
9]. 
21. See Jeff Parrott, Indiana First State to Scrap Local “Ban the Box” Laws, SOUTH BEND TRIB. 
(July 2, 2017), https://www.southbendtribune.com/news/local/indiana-first-state-to-scrap-local-ban-
the-box-laws/article_c1a31101-db3e-5d10-aae1-407396f1948e.html [https://perma.cc/ZU52-RMPN] 
(describing a local city council member’s proposed ordinance giving employers tax abatements for 
removing “the box,” now on hold in light of the recent studies).  
22. See, e.g., Jacqueline G. Kelley, Rehabilitate, Don’t Recidivate: A Reframing of the Ban the 
Box Debate, 22 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 590 (2017) (recommending rehabilitative measures over 
BTB laws to reduce recidivism).  
23. Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment Discrimination Against 
Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 52–55 (2015).  
24. Id. at 54–55; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 3 (Jeremy Travis et 
al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter GROWTH OF INCARCERATION], http://nap.edu/18613. These policies include 
mandatory-minimum and “three-strikes” sentencing laws and escalated enforcement of drug laws. Id. at 
70, 118.  
25. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 
2016 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf [https://perma.cc/B39W-3BXC]. 











policies have fallen out of favor in recent years, incarceration rates have 
started to decline,26 but the criminal records remain. A recent study 
estimates that nineteen million U.S. citizens have been convicted of a 
felony.27 This constitutes eight percent of the adult population, up from three 
percent in 1980.28  
The BTB movement grew out of a grassroots campaign, All of Us or 
None, by organizers at Legal Services for Prisoners with Children.29 The 
campaign’s goal has been to fight the barriers, such as housing 
discrimination and voting restrictions, that confront individuals attempting 
to reintegrate into society following criminal conviction.30 The “collateral 
consequences” of conviction persist long after the individual has supposedly 
paid his debt to society.31 The result is an aggravation of the conditions that 
breed crime, such as poverty and societal alienation.32 As collateral 
consequences accumulate, the risk of recidivism increases.33 
One of the strongest and most consistent predictors of recidivism is the 
inability to obtain long-term employment.34 The increased availability and 
use of criminal background checks by employers has exacerbated the 
difficulties of finding employment for individuals with criminal records.35 
Recognizing unemployment as the most damaging and persistent barrier to 
reentry, All of Us or None focused its earliest efforts on the first obstacle 
that individuals with criminal records encounter when seeking a job—the 
“box” on an application form that asks whether the applicant has ever been 
convicted of a crime.36 When an applicant checks “yes,” it often means the 
                                                      
26. Adam Gelb & Phillip Stevenson, U.S. Adult Incarceration Rate Declines 13% in 8 Years, 
PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/20 
17/01/12/us-adult-incarceration-rate-declines-13-percent-in-8-years [https://perma.cc/PA6R-G56V]. In 
2015, incarceration rates dropped from their peak in 2007 to levels not seen since 1998. Id. 
27. Shannon et al., supra note 10, at 1806. This comprises individuals currently in prison or on 
probation as well as individuals with past convictions.   
28. Id. at 1808.  
29. LINDA EVANS, LEGAL SERVS. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN, BAN THE BOX IN 
EMPLOYMENT: A GRASSROOTS HISTORY 10 (2016), http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/10/BTB-Employment-History-Report-2016.pdf [https://perm.cc/6QMY-3U3S]. 
30. Id. 
31. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues 
of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010). These consequences encompass permanent 
exclusions, such as ineligibility for welfare benefits and jury service, and minor penalties that aggregate, 
such as unpaid court fees that lead to civil judgments and wage garnishments. Id. at 459–60.   
32. Id. at 461–469.  
33. Id. at 467. See also Luke Caselman, Comment, Permissive Discrimination: How Committing 
a Crime Makes You a Criminal in Georgia, 65 MERCER L. REV. 759, 760–61 (2014). 
34. Flake, supra note 23, at 62–63. 
35. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 328 (2009); Alessandro Corda, More Justice and 
Less Harm: Reinventing Access to Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1 (2016). 













end of the applicant’s candidacy.37 However, if the question is postponed 
until later in the process, applicants with criminal records can get a “foot in 
the door.”38 As the theory goes, once an employer has invested a certain 
amount of time in recruiting an applicant, it will be more willing to hear the 
applicant explain the circumstances of the conviction and demonstrate 
rehabilitation.39 The employer may thus be more willing to discount the 
criminal record and hire the applicant.40  
The goals of BTB extend beyond improving the lives of individuals with 
criminal records and decreasing the risk of recidivism. BTB laws also seek 
to combat race discrimination.41 The policy changes that caused rising 
incarceration rates over the last forty years have affected minorities at much 
higher rates than whites.42 Drug law enforcement efforts, in particular, have 
disproportionately targeted black communities.43 Disproportionate policing 
of black and Hispanic individuals has driven up conviction rates among this 
group.44 Black men are particularly overrepresented in the criminal justice 
system—approximately one in three adult black men in the United States 
has a felony conviction.45 Young black men are particularly likely to have 
criminal convictions, and they often experience the collateral consequences 
of conviction most acutely, exacerbating existing challenges within their 
communities, including poverty and unemployment.46  
B. Current Legislation 
In 1998, Hawaii became the first state to ban inquiries into criminal 
records on applications by public and private employers.47 Since then, 
                                                      
37. See Holzer et al., supra note 8, at 453. 
38. Agan & Starr, supra note 18, at 6. 
39. Id.  
40. See Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young 
Black and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195 (2009) 
(finding increased callback rates for candidates with criminal records who had an opportunity to discuss 
the record with the employer). 
41. EVANS, supra note 29, at 16. 
42. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 24, at 56. 
43. Id. at 60. In the 1980s, drug arrest rates were six times higher among blacks than whites. Id. 
In more recent years, drug arrest rates have been three to four times higher among blacks. Id. This is 
despite evidence from longitudinal surveys that blacks engage in no more drug crimes (use and dealing) 
than whites. Id. at 50.  
44. Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment 
Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 231, 237–38 (2012). 
45. Shannon et al., supra note 10, at 1808.  
46. Pinard, supra note 31, at 470; see also Devah Pager et al., Employment Discrimination and 
the Changing Landscape of Low-Wage Labor Markets, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317 (2009) (examining 
worsening employment outcomes for black men among low-wage workers). 
47. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5 (2016); BETH AVERY & PHIL HERNANDEZ, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE POLICIES TO 











twenty other states have enacted legislation applying to public employers.48 
These laws vary in scope, with some applying only to state employers49 and 
others applying to city and county employers as well.50 In the absence of 
legislative action, governors in several states have issued orders banning the 
criminal-record question from applications for state employment.51  
BTB laws vary in terms of when during the candidate selection process 
employers can ask about criminal history. Some allow questions after an 
initial screening for minimum qualifications52 or during an interview,53 
while others allow questions only upon a “conditional offer of 
employment.”54 Many states authorize exceptions for positions in law 
enforcement or corrections,55 positions working with vulnerable 
populations (such as children or individuals with mental or physical 
disabilities),56 or positions with screening requirements mandated by other 
laws or regulations.57 No state wholly prohibits criminal screening for 
employment purposes.58  
Ten states currently have legislation applying to private employers.59 
Most recently, California expanded its BTB law to include private 
                                                      
ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS 9 (2018), http://www.n 
elp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/F48P-
BTBQ]. 
48. AVERY & HERNANDEZ, supra note 47, at 19–20.  
49. E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 42:1701 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-112(f)(2) (2017). 
50. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-5-101 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-202 (2017); N.M. STAT. 
§ 28-2-3 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73 (LexisNexis 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-52-102 
(LexisNexis 2017). 
51. Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia currently 
have executive orders in effect. AVERY & HERNANDEZ, supra note 47, at 19–20. 
52. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-202.  
53. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-203 (LexisNexis 2017).  
54. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5 (2016); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12952 (West 2017). 
55. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g)(4) (2017); OR. REV. STAT § 659A.360 (2017).  
56. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-5-101(1)(b) (2017). 
57. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495j(b)(1)(A) (2017) (allowing criminal-record inquiries 
for positions “for which any federal or State law or regulation creates a mandatory or presumptive 
disqualification based on a conviction”).  
58. Indeed, no state could enact such a law without conflicting with a plethora of laws barring 
individuals with criminal records from employment in certain positions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 
(2018) (barring investment companies from employing individuals convicted of securities law 
violations); 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2018) (barring FDIC-insured banks from employing individuals 
convicted of crimes of dishonesty or money laundering); 49 U.S.C. § 31310 (2018) (setting forth various 
convictions disqualifying employment as a commercial motor vehicle operator). For a thorough 
inventory of federal and state statutes and regulations imposing employment restrictions, among other 
collateral consequences of criminal convictions, see National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/map/ (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2018).  
59. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12952; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51i (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1 
(2016); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 75/15 (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(9 1/2) (2017); MINN. 
STAT. § 364.021 (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-11 to -19 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.360; 













employers with five or more employees.60 Other jurisdictions, however, 
have resisted extending BTB to private employers.61 Tennessee and Indiana 
have passed laws limiting the ability of local governments to enact BTB 
laws against private employers, even as they took action to ban criminal-
record inquiries in state employment.62  
C. Giving Offenders a “Fair Chance” 
In addition to BTB, some jurisdictions have enacted laws that require 
employers to engage in individualized assessments before making an 
adverse decision based on criminal records.63 This type of law arose in the 
context of an employment discrimination case.64 In Green v. Missouri 
Pacific Railroad Co.,65 a rejected applicant brought a discrimination claim 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act66 against a potential employer that 
refused to consider any applicant with a criminal record.67 Citing evidence 
of the disproportionate rate of conviction among black men, the plaintiff 
argued that using criminal history as a basis for hiring decisions has a 
disparate impact on minorities.68  
The Eighth Circuit agreed, noting that the defendant employer’s blanket 
ban had the effect of disqualifying black applicants at more than twice the 
rate of white applicants.69 The court also found that the blanket ban was not 
justified by business necessity because no consideration was given to 
different types of criminal records.70 In arriving at this holding, the court 
                                                      
60. Assemb. B. 1008, 2017 Leg. (Cal. 2017) (repealing CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.9 and replacing 
it with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12952). The new law went into effect January 1, 2018. See JONES DAY, 
2018 CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY UPDATE 2 (Feb. 2018), https://www.j 
onesday.com/files/Publication/1732d2ed-0be9-45e7-85de-18d6d0956535/Presentation/PublicationAtta 
chment/f58bb754-00c2-4db6-82bb-1baf8636a831/2018_California_Employment_Legislation_r2.pdf. 
61. IND. CODE § 22-2-17 (2017) (prohibiting local governments from limiting private employers’ 
inquiries into an applicant’s criminal history); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-51-1802(d) (2017) (prohibiting 
local governments from limiting private employers’ ability to request “any information on an 
application”).  
62. Ind. Exec. Order No. 17-15 (June 29, 2017), http://www.in.gov/gov/files/Executive-Order-1 
7-15-Fair-Chance-Hiring.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED3R-X3TA] (banning criminal-record inquiries in 
applications to the state’s executive branch); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-112 (2017) (banning criminal-
record inquiries in state employment applications). 
63. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g) (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-5-101 (2017); LA. 
STAT. ANN. § 42:1701 (2017). 
64. See generally Flake, supra note 23, at 72–81. 
65. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).  
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2016).  
67. 523 F.2d at 1292 (the employer refused to consider anyone with a criminal record other than 
a “minor traffic offense”). 
68. Id. at 1294–95. 
69. Id. at 1295. 
70. Id. at 1298. 











identified factors to consider when assessing applicants’ criminal records.71 
In addition to “the nature and seriousness of the crime in relation to the job 
sought,” employers might consider the “time elapsing since the conviction, 
the degree of the felon’s rehabilitation, and the circumstances under which 
the crime was committed.”72 
In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the 
agency tasked with enforcing Title VII, issued interpretive guidance on the 
use of criminal records in hiring decisions.73 Applying the factors from 
Green, the EEOC advises employers to consider “at least the nature of the 
crime, the time elapsed, and the nature of the job.”74 The EEOC further 
advises employers to perform an “individualized assessment” on applicants 
with criminal records, consisting of notice of the potential disqualification 
and an opportunity for the applicant to supply mitigating information to 
overcome the disqualification.75 Relevant information may include an 
explanation of the circumstances leading to the offense, employer or 
character references, and evidence of rehabilitation.76 
The EEOC’s guidance is not without its detractors.77 In 2013, the State 
of Texas sued the EEOC, challenging the guidance as an overreach of the 
EEOC’s authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).78 Even 
though the EEOC’s substantive interpretations of Title VII are not binding,79 
and even though the EEOC has no enforcement authority against state 
employers,80 Texas asserted that the guidance imposed mandatory standards 
on all employers’ hiring policies, overriding the State’s own determination 
of acceptable screening standards.81 Following an extended dispute over 
whether the EEOC’s guidance constitutes a “final agency action” under the 
APA,82 the case was ultimately disposed on summary judgment.83 The 
District Court enjoined the EEOC and the U.S. Attorney General from 
                                                      
71. Id. at 1297. 
72. Id. 
73. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, 
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII 
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE]. 
74. Id. at 14. 
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 18. 
77. See Flake, supra note 23, at 80–81.  
78. Texas v. EEOC, 827 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir.), vacated, 838 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2016). 
79. Id. at 376; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2018).  
80. 827 F.3d at 375. Only the Attorney General may bring actions against a State under Title VII. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2018). 
81. 827 F.3d at 378.  
82. Texas v. EEOC, No. 5:13-CV-255-C, 2014 WL 4782992, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2014) 
(dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); 827 F.3d at 388 (reversing the District 
Court’s dismissal); 838 F.3d at 511 (vacating the prior reversal and remanding in light of recent Supreme 
Court precedent on the APA).  













enforcing the guidance against Texas but dismissed the other claims for 
relief.84 Cross-appeals are pending in the Fifth Circuit.85 
Other states have embraced the EEOC’s guidance, incorporating the 
Green factors or similar criteria into their BTB laws.86 These types of 
statutes, commonly dubbed “Fair Chance” laws,87 have proven particularly 
popular at the local level, with nearly eighty cities and counties requiring 
some form of individualized assessment.88 Jurisdictions with Fair Chance 
laws have recognized that merely delaying inquiries cannot ensure that 
applicants with criminal records receive fair consideration so long as the 
stigma against criminal records persists.89  
II. RESEARCH INTO THE EFFECTS OF BAN-THE-BOX 
A. At the Preliminary Stage 
While BTB laws continue to expand and develop, recent research 
suggests that they may have the opposite of the intended effect, resulting in 
increases in race discrimination in hiring.90 The first significant research 
into the effects of BTB looked at callback rates for applicants before and 
                                                      
84. Id. Texas also sought a declaration of its right to “absolutely bar” individuals with felony 
convictions from state employment and an injunction against the EEOC from issuing right-to-sue letters 
to any individual who files a complaint against a state agency on the basis of criminal history. 2014 WL 
4782992, at *1.  
85. See Erin Mulvaney, US Justice Department Opens New Front Against EEOC, NAT’L L.J. 
(Sept. 6, 2018, 10:45 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/09/06/us-justice-department-
opens-new-front-against-eeoc/?slreturn=20180928001414. Although joining the EEOC in the appeal, 
the U.S. Department of Justice distanced itself from the EEOC’s position, expressly disagreeing with 
the guidance and disclaiming any intent to pursue enforcement actions based on criminal-record policies. 
Id. This move was not unexpected by civil rights groups involved in the case. See Braden Campbell, 
Texas Judge Denies NAACP Bid to Intervene in EEOC Case, LAW360 (Aug. 24, 2017, 4:45 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/957375/texas-judge-denies-naacp-bid-to-intervene-in-eeoc-case [http 
s://perma.cc/5YH7-29CL]. Amicus briefs in support of the EEOC have been filed by the NAACP, the 
National Employment Law Project, and Beverly Harrison. Mulvaney, supra.  
86. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12952(c)(1)(A) (West 2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-5-101(4) (2017); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g)(3) (2017); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1701(B) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 
364.032 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-112(c) (2018). 
87. AVERY & HERNANDEZ, supra note 47, at 1.  
88. Id. at 96–101. More than 150 cities have BTB ordinances of some kind. Id. Large 
metropolitan cities have led the way on BTB legislation, including extending Fair Chance laws to private 
employers. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 49 (2014); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(10) 
(2018).  
89. See, e.g., N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE 
FAIR CHANCE ACT, LOCAL LAW NO. 63, AT 1–2 (2015), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/p 
df/FCA-InterpretiveGuide-112015.pdf (finding that discrimination still occurred where employers were 
not required to consider any particular factors when assessing criminal records); see also Pager et al., 
supra note 40, at 200–01 (finding that employers who did not inquire into a candidate’s criminal history 
were less likely to proceed with those candidates, compared to employers who engaged in conversation). 
90. Agan & Starr, supra note 18; Doleac & Hansen, supra note 18. 











after BTB laws applying to private employers went into effect.91 This study, 
by Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr, looked at two jurisdictions—the State of 
New Jersey and New York City.92 The study used an “audit” methodology, 
a format for testing employer attitudes by submitting fictitious applications 
to job postings and tracking employer responses.93 Research assistants 
submitted applications in pairs consisting of one white and one black 
applicant, coded as such by first and last names distinctly associated with 
each race.94 The fictitious applicants were all men in their early twenties 
with similar work histories.95 The researchers assigned randomized 
variables to each applicant: one with a felony conviction and one without, 
one with a one-year employment gap and one without, and one with a GED 
and one with a high school diploma.96  
Research assistants submitted 15,220 fictitious applications during two 
periods—once a few months before and once a few months after BTB went 
into effect.97 They searched for jobs exclusively from private employers and 
chiefly from large chain businesses.98 They applied to jobs requiring little 
to no work experience, no postsecondary education, and no specialized 
skills.99 When an employer was hiring during both the pre- and post-BTB 
periods, they submitted applications both times, using different paired 
applicants.100 Each applicant supplied a unique email address and phone 
number.101 For eight weeks following the submission of applications, the 
researchers tracked callbacks through voicemails or emails from the 
employer requesting a return call or an interview.102  
The study found that in the pre-BTB period, employers that asked about 
criminal records called black and white applicants at roughly the same 
                                                      
91. Agan & Starr, supra note 18, at 1. 
92. Id. at 9. 
93. Id. at 9–10. Auditing studies have been a popular means of testing implicit bias in hiring. 
See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than 
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 
(2004).  
94. Agan & Starr, supra note 18, at 12–13. The researchers obtained names from birth certificate 
data and excluded names that were uncommon, to avoid bias from perceived socioeconomic status 
associated with unique names or spellings. Id. The resulting names (e.g., “Scott Weber” and “Terrell 
Washington”) were generic enough to be unexceptionable while still signaling race. Id. at 56. 
95. Id. at 11.  
96. Id. The latter two factors were chosen for their potential to signal criminal history on a job 
application.   
97. Id. at 9, 15.  
98. Id. at 10. Chain businesses were chosen due to the likelihood of an online application process 
and the certainty that the number of employees was in scope for the applicable BTB law. Id. 
99. Id.  
100. Id. at 14.  
101. Id. at 12.  













rates.103 Employers that did not have the box slightly favored white 
applicants.104 Among employers that did, applicants without records 
received sixty-one percent more callbacks.105 In the post-BTB period, 
among employers who had previously asked about criminal records, white 
applicants received thirty-six percent more callbacks than black 
applicants.106 Agan and Starr conclude that, in the absence of concrete 
information, employers rely on guesswork about which candidates might 
have criminal records.107 Since black men are more likely to have a criminal 
record, they are therefore more likely to be rejected, a process known as 
“statistical discrimination.”108  
B. Overall Employment Outcomes 
Agan and Starr’s work provides critical research into the effect of BTB 
on the very first stage of the candidate selection process, but the implication 
for overall employment outcomes is necessarily limited.109 The next notable 
research paper on BTB picks up where Agan and Starr’s work ends.110 
Relying on data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Jennifer Doleac 
and Benjamin Hansen compared employment rates before and after 
enactment of BTB laws and between BTB and non-BTB jurisdictions.111 
Whereas Agan and Starr focused on two jurisdictions with BTB laws 
covering private employers, Doleac and Hansen looked at all jurisdictions 
with BTB laws applied to at least public employers.112 Similar to Agan and 
Starr, they focused on employment rates among young black and Hispanic 
men (ages twenty-five to thirty-four), the group most likely to be affected 
by both BTB policies and statistical discrimination based on conviction 
rates.113  
                                                      
103. Id. at 17. Callback rates for white and black applicants were 11.1% and 10.9%, respectively.  
104. Id. Callback rates were 12.5% for white applicants and 9.4% for black applicants. Id. 
105. Id. at 31.  
106. Id. at 26. Whites received callbacks 15% of the time, while blacks received callbacks 11% 
of the time. Id. 
107. Id. at 37. 
108. Id.  
109. See id. at 31 (pointing out that the study is limited to initial employer responses and does not 
address whether BTB actually affects employment rates). 
110. Doleac & Hansen, supra note 18. 
111. Id. at 4.  
112. Id. at 11. Doleac and Hansen argue that enactment of public BTB laws influences the private 
labor market enough to draw conclusions from overall employment rates, pointing to the heavily 
publicized campaigns by organizations like All of Us or None that often precede legislation and the 
increasing adoption of internal BTB policies by large employers such as Wal-Mart and Target. Id. 
113. Id. at 4.  











This study found that young black and Hispanic men were, respectively, 
5.1% and 2.9% less likely to be employed after enactment of BTB.114 Where 
other factors affected overall employment rates, differences between whites 
and minorities confirmed the detrimental impact of BTB on minorities.115 
For example, in times of high unemployment overall, the negative impact 
of BTB on minorities increased, while employment among white men 
remained relatively stable.116 In regions where the low-skilled labor market 
is dominated by minorities (i.e., the South for blacks and the West for 
Hispanics), the negative effects of BTB were virtually nonexistent, 
suggesting that employers are less likely to engage in statistical 
discrimination where it is simply infeasible to do so.117 These results suggest 
that where there are more candidates to choose from and more white 
candidates in the pool, employers are more likely to discriminate against 
blacks and Hispanics in BTB jurisdictions.118  
The results were not all negative for minority candidates. First, older 
black men (aged thirty-five to sixty-four) and college-educated black 
women saw rising employment rates as a result of BTB.119 Doleac and 
Hansen minimize these results on the basis that these groups are not the 
intended beneficiaries of BTB laws.120 However, by focusing only on young 
black and Hispanic men, Doleac and Hansen define the goals of BTB more 
narrowly than legislators and activists intended.121 As the story of Beverly 
Harrison makes clear, criminal records cast a long shadow on an 
individual’s employment prospects, and the effect is felt by all those who 
have entered the criminal justice system.122 Second, Doleac and Hansen 
found that the negative effects of BTB leveled off among young Hispanic 
men within three years of enactment of BTB.123 Doleac and Hansen theorize 
that these men “adapt to the policy over time, perhaps by using their 
networks to find jobs and signal their job-readiness to employers.”124 
                                                      
114. Id. at 17. 
115. Id. at 19–24. 
116. Id. at 20.  
117. Id. at 19. The negative effect on black men in the South was statistically insignificant, and 
the effect on Hispanic men in the West was near zero. Id.  
118. Id. at 19–20.  
119. Id. at 21–22. Doleac and Hansen theorize that the positive effects of BTB on women is due 
to “intrahousehold substitution of labor,” suggesting that these women only entered the workforce 
because their partners were unable to find jobs (as a result of BTB). Id. at 22. 
120. Id. at 4–5. 
121. See Gov. Brown Signs AB1008 the Ban the Box / Fair Chance Hiring Act!, LEGAL SERVS. 
FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN (Oct. 14, 2017), http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/2017/10/gov-
brown-signs-ab1008-the-ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-act [https://perma.cc/4S7G-H3VA]. 
122. See Harrison, supra note 1. 
123. Doleac & Hansen, supra note 18, at 22–23.  
124. Id. at 23. Doleac and Hansen do not linger on the significance of this “adaptive” response, 
but it suggests a path to combating the apparent negative effects of BTB. Personal networks are a 













Notwithstanding these positive to neutral effects, the negative effects on 
young minority men evidenced by this and Agan and Starr’s study cannot 
be ignored if the goals of BTB are to be fully realized.  
III. THE INFORMATION-WITHHOLDING PROBLEM 
A. Other Research on the Candidate Selection Process 
The studies previously discussed are consistent with other research on 
the candidate selection process. BTB laws are not the only attempt by 
legislators to restrict the information available to employers as a solution to 
discrimination in hiring. Like BTB, other information-withholding laws 
seem to lead to the exact forms of discrimination they seek to eradicate.  
In 2006, Harry J. Holzer and his colleagues anticipated the negative 
effects of BTB.125 In a survey of employer practices, they found that 
employers that performed criminal background screenings were more likely 
to have placed a black applicant in their most recently filled position than 
those who did not.126 This likelihood increased if the employer expressed a 
strong aversion to hiring individuals with criminal records.127 Holzer and 
his colleagues theorize that the increased likelihood is due to those 
employers correcting their initial overestimations of the likelihood of a 
criminal conviction among black applicants, supporting the theory that 
statistical discrimination is at the root of preferences against black 
applicants.128 
A study on bans on pre-employment credit reports found similar negative 
effects for black individuals.129 Eleven states and a few localities, including 
New York City, have banned the use of credit reports as a basis for hiring 
decisions.130 The rationale for banning credit reports is similar to BTB: 
minorities are more likely to have poor credit and therefore more likely to 
be adversely affected by pre-employment credit checks.131 Using data from 
the CPS and state unemployment records, Bartik and Nelson examined the 
                                                      
why that group has been able to adapt, the better question might be why low-skilled black men have not. 
See, e.g., Pager et al., supra note 40, at 201–02 (finding that employers are less likely to engage black 
applicants in conversation and that less engagement translates to less job offers). 
125. Holzer et al., supra note 8.  
126. Id. at 465.  
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 471. 
129. Alexander W. Bartik & Scott T. Nelson, Credit Reports as Résumés: The Incidence of Pre-
Employment Credit Screening (MIT Dep’t of Econ., Paper No. 16-01, 2016). 
130. Id. at 1. Most jurisdictions with bans exempt job positions with access to finances or other 
private and sensitive information. Id. at 5. Management positions and jobs in finance and law 
enforcement are the most common exemptions. See id. at 41.  
131. Id.  











flow of employment in states with credit check bans, comparing job-finding 
rates against jurisdictions without bans as well as within jurisdictions before 
and after bans went into effect.132 They found that enactment of credit-check 
bans reduced the probability of job-finding among black job seekers.133 The 
researchers concluded that statistical discrimination was responsible for this 
effect.134 
Another study examined the effects of differing drug testing policies.135 
Abigail Wozniak used data from the CPS to track employment rates across 
a twelve-year period during and after which employers instituted drug 
testing policies and states passed laws either incentivizing or limiting drug 
testing.136 The results demonstrated an increase in employment among 
blacks relative to whites in states with pro-testing policies.137 The opposite 
effect was observed in states with anti-testing policies, although to a lesser 
degree.138  
Wozniak’s study is particularly illuminating because the prevalence of 
illegal drug use is roughly equal among blacks and whites.139 While 
discrimination based on presumed criminal and credit history has a 
statistical foundation (hence the ascription of “statistical discrimination”), 
discrimination based on presumed drug use is purely prejudicial.140 
Wozniak concludes that the increased employment of blacks in pro-testing 
states, relative to employment of whites, was a correction of employers’ 
initial overestimate of drug use by black candidates.141  
Finally, a study on disclosure of marital/family status took a different 
approach but drew similar conclusions.142 Joni Hersch and Jennifer Bennett 
Shinall’s study was designed to test the effect of perceived prohibitions on 
asking about a candidate’s marital status or family in job interviews.143 
                                                      
132. Id. at 8, 13–15. 
133. Id. at 26–27. The results were inconsistent and inconclusive as to white and Hispanic job 
seekers but suggested a negligible or positive effect. Id.  
134. Id. at 27. 
135. Abigail Wozniak, Discrimination and the Effects of Drug Testing on Black Employment, 97 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 548 (2015).  
136. Id. at 548, 550–51.  
137. Id. at 557. Employment of blacks increased by seven to ten percent relative to all other states 
and thirty percent relative to anti-testing states. Id. at 564.   
138. Id. at 557–58.  
139. Id. at 551 (citing surveys of the National Survey on Drug Use and Health from 1990 to 2006 
indicating that thirteen percent of whites and twelve percent of blacks reported recent drug use).  
140. Id. (citing studies showing widespread misperceptions of disproportionate drug use among 
blacks).  
141. Id. at 564. 
142. Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information Exchange 
Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49 (2016). 
143. Id. Although there are no laws at the federal, state, or local level prohibiting such questions, 
there is a strong perception among the general population that they are illegal. See id. at 52–53 n.12. The 













Operating on a theory of “ambiguity aversion,”144 Hersch and Shinall 
conducted a vignette study to investigate attitudes toward disclosure of 
marital/family status.145 The study presented a hypothetical situation of two 
candidates, both women, with similar educational and work histories and a 
similar ten-year employment gap.146 The scenario varied as to whether the 
candidate supplied a reason for the gap and, if so, whether the gap was due 
to children being in school or financial necessity due to divorce.147 
Participants in the study were then asked to pick a candidate to hire.148  
In scenarios where the candidates supplied differing reasons, participants 
were most likely to select the divorced candidate, suggesting a preference 
against the candidate with children.149 In scenarios where one candidate 
supplied a reason and one did not, participants were most likely to select the 
candidate who supplied a reason, no matter what it was.150 Hersch and 
Shinall conclude that prohibiting conversations about marital/family status 
only makes it more difficult for women who left their careers to have 
children to reenter the workforce later.151 Instead, they recommend moving 
“from information-stifling to information-promoting” and encouraging 
employers to engage candidates in open conversation to determine and 
respond to their need for work-life balance.152  
Taken together, these studies show that individuals prefer more 
information over less when it comes to making decisions. Laws designed to 
inhibit the flow of information to employers only limit their ability to make 
                                                      
See id. at 54 n.16. The perception is based in part on the EEOC’s guidance cautioning employers against 
such questions, due to the risk of applying the question in a discriminatory manner (i.e., by asking only 
women or by treating only women adversely because of their answers). Id. at 52.  
144. Ambiguity aversion is a theory of behavioral economics that “individuals prefer known risks 
over unknown risks.” Id. at 55.  
145. Id. 
146. Id. The study varied the candidates’ educational information slightly as a potential indicator 
of work performance. One candidate, Lisa, attended an “elite” university and one, Jessica, attended a 
public college. Id. at 76. The results show a consistent but slight preference for Lisa across all metrics. 
Id. at 80. The addition of this variable means that each test scenario, as discussed below, produces two 
results—one where Lisa is the favored candidate and one where Jessica is the favored candidate. Id. In 
each case, the higher percentage relates to Lisa. Id. 
147. Id. at 78.  
148. Id. at 79. 
149. Id. at 83–84. Between sixty-four and seventy-four percent of participants chose the divorced 
candidate. Id. Hersch and Shinall suggest that the preference for the divorced candidate is based on the 
expressed financial need, making the divorced candidate more likely to be dedicated and hard-working. 
Id. at 79. 
150. Id. at 81–82. Between eighty-one and eighty-nine percent of participants chose the candidate 
who supplied a reason. Id. The favorability of the candidate who supplied a reason varied by one to three 
percent according to the reason. Id. at 82. 
151. Id. at 86. 
152. Id. at 87–89.  











informed hiring decisions, leaving the door open for increased 
discrimination.  
B. The Candidate’s Experience 
The information-withholding problem works both ways. From the 
candidate’s perspective, the background screening process is a black box. 
The candidate supplies her basic information, typically to a third-party 
screening vendor.153 After some time, a report is produced and sent to the 
employer. If the employer wishes to revoke an offer or terminate an 
applicant’s candidacy based on information in the screening, it must provide 
the applicant with a copy of the screening report, but no further 
communication or explanation by the employer is required.154  
The screening form itself is often a puzzle. Noting the “gatekeeping 
function” that applications serve, Mike Vuolo and his colleagues conducted 
a survey of job applications for entry-level positions across a variety of 
industries in the private sector to determine how employers ask about 
criminal history in a non-BTB jurisdiction.155 Testers posing as entry-level 
candidates collected application forms from 416 employers.156 Among the 
323 employers that asked about criminal records, the question was 
formulated in thirty-four substantially different ways, ranging from highly 
specific (“Have you ever been convicted of offenses such as homicide, 
crimes against the person, crimes of compulsion, sex crimes, incest, theft, 
and [sic] burglary, arson, obscene phone calls, assault, possession or use of 
narcotics?”) to extremely broad (“Have you been convicted or charged of a 
crime?”).157 The most common questions were “Have you been convicted 
of a felony?” and “Have you been convicted of a crime?”158  
These questions, as Vuolo and his colleagues point out, are unlimited in 
temporal scope, potentially requiring a candidate to disclose juvenile 
                                                      
153. Background screening vendors are regulated under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2016). Among other things, the FCRA regulates the use of screening reports by 
employers and disclosures of screening reports to applicants. § 1681b(a)(3)(B), (b)(3)(A). 
154. Providing a copy of the report that prompted an “adverse action” is one of the few obligations 
placed on employers by the FCRA. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). The employer’s obligation terminates at providing 
the report and contact information for the screening vendor. § 1681m(a). If the candidate wishes to 
dispute the accuracy of the adverse information, she must do so directly with the screening vendor. § 
1681m(a)(4)(B). The employer may reject the candidate based on the screening report even if it is 
erroneous or misleading. See generally Noam Weiss, Note, Combating Inaccuracies in Criminal 
Background Checks by Giving Meaning to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 271 
(2012).  
155. Mike Vuolo et al., Criminal Record Questions in the Era of “Ban the Box”, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 139, 140 (2017). 
156. Id. at 148. 
157. Id. at 147–48.  













records or older convictions.159 These types of records are subject to 
restricted public access in many states, including Minnesota, where the 
study was conducted.160 Unclear criminal-record questions put candidates 
to the test of either disclosing privileged information or not disclosing it and 
risking negative consequences if the employer discovers it another way. 
C. Difficulties in the Antidiscrimination Response 
The lack of information on the candidate’s side is a problem for reasons 
other than the candidate’s own interest. Title VII guarantees all citizens the 
right to seek employment undeterred by discrimination.161 But without 
information about the decisions that go into hiring, a rejected candidate 
often has no way of knowing whether she was a victim of discrimination.162 
Rejecting candidates on the basis of racial stereotypes is flatly illegal, but 
proving such discrimination is another matter.163  
Title VII offers two models of proof for an employment discrimination 
claim: disparate treatment and disparate impact.164 Under a disparate 
treatment claim, a rejected applicant must show that the employer 
intentionally discriminated against the applicant “because of” the 
applicant’s race.165 A disparate impact claim requires showing that a facially 
neutral hiring practice or policy has a discriminatory effect.166 Both types of 
claims present difficulties for candidates seeking to prove discrimination in 
hiring.  
A rejected applicant would face substantial obstacles in bringing a 
disparate treatment claim. First, employers are not required to collect 
demographic information about candidates before hiring them.167 An 
                                                      
159. Id. at 146.  
160. Id. Minnesota prohibits public access to juvenile records. MINN. STAT. §§ 13.82, 260B.171 
(2018). It also limits public disclosures of adult convictions to fifteen years following discharge. MINN. 
STAT. § 13.87(1)(b) (2018). 
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2016). 
162. See Nina Kucharczyk, Note, Thinking Outside the Box: Reforming Employment 
Discrimination Doctrine to Combat the Negative Consequences of Ban-the-Box Legislation, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2803, 2829–30 (2017).  
163. See Flake, supra note 23, at 80 (summarizing the EEOC’s efforts to litigate claims based on 
criminal-record policies). 
164. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 
902–03 (2017).  
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
166. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).  
167. Employers with 100 or more employees are required to submit annual reports to the EEOC 
of the race and gender of their employees, but they are not required to collect this information from 
applicants. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2017). Subject to a public hearing, the EEOC has the authority to expand 
its reporting requirements as it deems necessary. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1602.11. However, 
efforts to do so face significant opposition from employers, who find the requirements onerous. Most 











employer may have names and resumes for applicants to a position, but it is 
not required to collect information about applicants’ races.168 A rejected 
candidate who suspects discrimination and files a charge with the EEOC 
would be stymied at the investigative stage, if there is no data to support 
disparate treatment of minority applicants. Second, even if an applicant is 
able to gather sufficient evidence that an employer rejected qualified 
minority candidates in favor of white candidates, the case doesn’t end there. 
Under the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court for 
employment discrimination cases,169 after the applicant establishes a prima 
facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to present a 
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the apparent discrimination.170 
In the context of background screening, the employer may assert that a 
minority candidate’s criminal record raised a legitimate safety concern.171 
Courts routinely defer to employers in these choices and easily find the 
employer has met its burden.172 The burden then returns to the applicant to 
adduce evidence that the employer’s proffered reason was mere pretext for 
discrimination.173 A disparate treatment claim, therefore, inevitably hinges 
on proof of the employer’s intent, which is difficult to prove absent overt 
expressions of prejudice.174  
A disparate impact claim, on the other hand, needs no proof of the 
employer’s intent.175 Statistical evidence that a particular screening metric 
excludes minority candidates at disproportionate rates would be sufficient 
to show that the effect is discriminatory.176 However, the employer will 
                                                      
recently, the EEOC’s proposal to require salary data faced heavy criticism and was eventually suspended 
by the Trump Administration. Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO–1) and Comment 
Request, 81 Fed. Reg. 5113 (proposed Feb. 1, 2016); Allen Smith, SHRM to Congress: EEO-1’s Pay 
Reporting Will Be Misleading, Burdensome, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (May 30, 2017), https://w 
ww.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/shrm-eeo-1-pay-reporti 
ng.aspx [https://perma.cc/6S7Z-W2CM]; Stephen Miller, White House Suspends Pay-Data Reporting 
on Revised EEO-1 Form, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/resou 
rcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/pages/revised-eeo-1-form-suspended.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZA6 
2-RGWN] 
168. Kucharczyk, supra note 162, at 2834–35. See also Matthews v. Waukesha Cty., 759 F.3d 
821, 824 (7th Cir. 2014) (employees involved in the hiring process did not receive race information 
while reviewing resumes).  
169. The seminal case establishing the burden-shifting framework is McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
170. Id. at 802.  
171. See Flake, supra note 23, at 81–84 (discussing employers’ concerns about negligent hiring 
liability). 
172. Id. at 74; Kucharczyk, supra note 162, at 2829–30. 
173. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.  
174. See, e.g., Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and 
Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 924–25 (2014).  
175. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  
176. Id. at 430 (noting the historically inferior education of black people when assessing 













overcome a disparate impact claim if it can show that its screening practices 
were “job related” and “consistent with business necessity.”177 Courts, 
again, defer to employers in these decisions.178 The applicant may still 
prevail if he can show that there were less discriminatory alternatives 
available, but it is unclear what that would look like in the context of hiring 
decisions.179  
While the unintended discriminatory effects of BTB laws seem to 
demand an antidiscrimination response, there are practical obstacles to 
enforcement under Title VII. Employers’ hiring decisions, though restricted 
on the front end by BTB and similar laws, are given significant deference 
upon review. Limitations on information-sharing impact not just employers 
but also candidates and the EEOC when they seek proof of discrimination.  
IV. BAN THE BLACK BOX 
The candidate selection process suffers from a dearth of information on 
all sides. Employers consistently prefer more information over less when it 
comes to making hiring decisions, but it is not clear how this preference can 
best meet BTB’s antidiscrimination goal. Some commentators have called 
for reopening the door and making information about criminal records even 
more easily accessible.180 This would seem to address the basic problem of 
statistical discrimination in hiring, but it disregards the more deeply rooted 
discrimination that leads to disproportionate policing and sentencing of 
black and Hispanic men.181 Stereotypes about criminality are thus 
undisturbed and even reinforced, as easier access to criminal records might 
only confirm a link between race and criminality.182 Furthermore, repealing 
BTB laws would detract from the goal of improving the lives of individuals 
                                                      
(8th Cir. 1975) (blanket criminal-record ban affects black applicants at much higher rate than whites, 
establishing prima facie case of race discrimination). 
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2016); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424.  
178. See El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that criminal-record policies 
“ultimately concern the management of risk” and holding that disqualification of applicants convicted 
of violent crimes was justified for a position as a paratransit driver). 
179. Scholars have pointed out the difficulties of applying the disparate impact theory to any 
context except a single screening tool. See Kim, supra note 164, at 906–07. Ironically, the EEOC’s 
efforts may have contributed to the difficulties. With more employers engaging in individualized 
assessments in line with the EEOC’s guidance, it would be difficult for applicants to establish the 
background check itself as the source of the discriminatory policy. See, e.g., STERLING TALENT SOLS., 
supra note 6, at 23 (reporting that fifty-seven percent of employers conduct individualized assessments). 
Thus, a court may find that a particular screening tool is unlawful, see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424, but it 
would be less likely to find disparate impact within a holistic hiring process. 
180. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 363 
(2008).  
181. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.  
182. See Paul-Emile, supra note 174, at 897–98.  











with criminal records and reducing the risk of recidivism.183 The apparent 
negative effects of BTB call for a solution, but it must do more than weigh 
two forms of racial discrimination to identify the lesser of two evils. The 
solution must hold employers accountable for their discriminatory conduct. 
If a lack of information is the problem, then the burden should fall to 
employers to start sharing.  
Employers, before they even begin to review applications, should notify 
any and all potential applicants of what to expect. Job postings should 
delineate what will and will not be included in a background check and what 
factors will be used to assess each element.184 Minimum required elements 
should include: at what stage of the application process a background check 
will be initiated and evaluated, what types of checks will be performed (not 
just criminal records, but also credit checks, verifications of 
licenses/certifications, etc.), and the scope of the check (e.g., how many 
years, which jurisdictions). Beyond these basic details, employers should 
provide some idea of what kinds of records constitute a disqualification. It 
would not be necessary for employers to contemplate every felony or 
misdemeanor in existence, but it would be necessary to consider the 
categories of offenses they might encounter.185 The EEOC’s guidance, 
which many employers already follow,186 would be instrumental in helping 
employers set the parameters in close cases.187 
Requiring employers to set firm and consistent screening policies in 
advance might seem to run counter to the EEOC’s emphasis on 
individualized assessments and to scholars’ recommendations of an 
interactive information-gathering process modeled on the reasonable 
accommodation requirements of the ADA.188 However, requiring 
employers to apply consistent standards is necessary to ensure 
                                                      
183. See supra notes 23–40 and accompanying text. Discrimination against individuals with 
criminal records is a concern in itself for BTB activists, distinct from the discriminatory effect on racial 
minorities. See EVANS, supra note 29, at 8.  
184. This is not a radical departure from the requirements of many current public-employment 
BTB laws. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-112(a) (2017) (requiring job postings to include a notice 
that information about criminal history will be requested).  
185. Employers that hire at high volumes often already have predetermined standards for 
evaluating criminal records, including categories of offenses that are of “particular concern” and 
procedures for escalating adverse decisions to senior officers. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 
2d 783, 788 (D. Md. 2013) (detailing defendant employer’s “multi-step evaluation process” for 
reviewing candidate background checks).   
186. One survey shows that fifty-seven percent of employers currently perform individualized 
assessment of criminal records, in line with the EEOC’s guidance. STERLING TALENT SOLS., supra note 
6, at 23.  
187. For example, an employer might give some thought to how multiple offenses or very recent 
offenses affect the severity of a candidate’s criminal record. See EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 73, at 14. 













nondiscriminatory practices.189 If employers rely on racial stereotypes to 
determine whether a potential employee is likely to commit criminal acts in 
the workplace, then allowing employers to assess criminal history on an ad 
hoc basis will do nothing to prevent discriminatory decisions. Between two 
candidates with similar criminal records, an employer without consistent 
standards may very well hire the white candidate and reject the black 
candidate on the basis of an “intuition” of each candidate’s likelihood of 
reoffending.190  
For this strategy to be effective, employers would need to be held to the 
standards they declare in their job postings and penalized for deviations. 
The enforcement procedures of Title VII offer a solution, and greater 
transparency by employers would resolve some of the challenges of 
antidiscrimination litigation.191 If an employer declares a specific policy 
with regard to criminal checks but disregards that policy to reject a minority 
applicant, such conduct would constitute a clear case of disparate 
treatment.192 Additionally, if an employer’s stated policy fails to relate to 
the job in question or to fulfill any business necessity, then any 
discriminatory effect of the policy could form the basis of a valid disparate 
impact claim.193  
Even in the absence of legislative action, employers should consider 
instituting these policies for their own benefit. By publicizing their 
background screening policies, employers can demonstrate that they have 
put thought into their hiring decisions, which may cut short potential 
litigation by rejected applicants.194 Moreover, if applicants who are sure to 
be rejected know this fact in advance, they will be less likely to apply. 
Employers could rely on this dissuasive effect to trust that their candidate 
pool has been filtered of applicants that do not meet their requirements. 
With fewer ineligible applicants to wade through, the candidate selection 
process will become more efficient.  
The process would also be more efficient for applicants with criminal 
records. They would be able to focus their job search on employers willing 
                                                      
189. See Pager et al., supra note 46, at 322, 334–36 (finding that when screening standards are 
particularly subjective, non-white applicants are more likely to be rejected for perceived personality 
traits or not being the right “fit”). 
190. Cf. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 957–58 (2003) 
(finding that white individuals with criminal records fare slightly better in the job market than black 
individuals without criminal records).  
191. See supra notes 161–167 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra notes 168–173 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 174–178 and accompanying text. 
194. Considering the courts’ consistent deference to employers’ business decisions, see supra 
notes 172 & 178 and accompanying text, employers would have little cause to fear a substantial increase 
in litigation costs arising from well-reasoned background screening policies. 











to hire them.195 A clear policy announced in advance may even embolden 
an individual to apply for a position he might otherwise disregard.196 The 
ambiguities of the job application process will become a little clearer, 
allowing individuals to respond to criminal-record inquiries with 
confidence.197 Knowing the factors that will be taken into consideration 
would allow applicants time to collect documents and prepare statements 
they may need to attest to their rehabilitation.198   
Finally, more transparency by employers during the candidate selection 
process would help to fully realize the goals of BTB. It would resolve a 
common complaint about BTB—that it merely delays inevitable 
rejections.199 It would also help to remove the stigma around criminal 
records. Instead of something to avoid or dread, addressing criminal records 
would become simply another step in the process.200  
CONCLUSION 
Ban-the-Box (BTB) laws delay employer inquiries into job applicants’ 
criminal histories and thereby seek to improve the lives of individuals with 
criminal records, reduce the risk of recidivism as a result of unemployment, 
and redress the harms of race discrimination in the criminal justice system 
and in employment. As more jurisdictions enact BTB and similar laws, 
study after study shows that withholding information during the hiring 
process does not help disadvantaged candidates and may in fact harm them. 
However, rolling back BTB laws only reinstates the status quo: automatic 
rejections for anyone who answers “yes” to the criminal-record question. If 
a lack of information is the problem, the solution may lie in increasing 
information to the candidate.201 Instead of being left in the dark about the 
                                                      
195. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
196. For the same reasons that employers prefer to make hiring decisions on the basis of more 
information rather than less, it seems reasonable to assume that candidates prefer to apply to jobs about 
which they have more information rather than less. And in the absence of more complete information, 
candidates with criminal records may make assumptions about the kinds of jobs that are available to 
them and shut themselves out of jobs with better career prospects. 
197. See supra notes 153–160 and accompanying text.  
198. Requirements regarding documentation and statements should also be explicated during the 
application process. Here, again, employers may rely on language from the EEOC GUIDANCE, supra 
note 73, at 18, to indicate possible means of proving rehabilitation. 
199. See Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact 
and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 216 
(2014); STERLING TALENT SOLS., supra note 6, at 20. 
200. See Pager et al., supra note 40, at 204–08 (finding increased callback rates when the employer 
invited early conversation about criminal records).   
201. Because the information-withholding problem appears likely to surface in multiple areas of 
the candidate selection process, the solution presented here may have equal value elsewhere. Bans on 
employer inquiries into compensation history are gaining in popularity in several localities, as a measure 













employer’s selection criteria, candidates might act as the first filter, 
selecting themselves out of jobs for which they are not qualified and into 
those that can provide real opportunities. 
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